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Abstract 
 
In January 2008, China imposed a new labour contract law. This new law is the most significant 
reform to the law of employment relations in mainland China in more than a decade. The paper 
provides a theoretical framework on the inter-linkages between labour market regulation, option 
value and the choice and timing of employment. All in all, the paper demonstrates that the Labour 
Contract Law in it´s own right will have only small impacts upon employment in the fast-growing 
Chinese economy. On the contrary,  induced increasing unit labour costs represent the real issue and 
may reduce employment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Although China has made awe-inspiring progress in economic development and growth, it is facing 
formidable employment challenges while transforming toward a knowledge and service-based 
economy and further opening up to international competition after its WTO accession. One of the 
biggest challenges during transition is how to create 100-300 million new jobs in the coming decade 
to absorb the millions of laid-off workers, rural migrant workers and newly added labour force. 
Furthermore, it is quite obvious that Chinese workers and their families have lost the job security 
and social welfare that they enjoyed for decades before the Reform Era. It may not have been much, 
but it was a safety net. That has gone. This is one of the root causes of the kind of protests which 
have developed in China, extreme social insecurity.1 As a response to this, the government has 
announced that it wants to bring in policies aimed at restoring a more harmonious society. There is 
an apparent shift in government perception that that something has to be done. China´s new Labour 
Contract Law which became effective on 1 January 2008 can be considered as being part of this 
attempt to grapple with this issue.2  
The new Labour Contract Law has stirred up a great deal of controversy among economists and has 
raised concerns about the sustainability of China´s economic growth. The opponents of reform have 
gone so far as to threaten a flight of capital if these changes become law.3 They view the law as the 
twilight of the age of cheap labour in China, undermining the country’s most prized comparative 
advantage. Using more moderate language, the American Chamber of Commerce in China has filed 
lengthy objections to the reforms with the legislature, insisting that the improvements designed to 
protect workers from casualisation and arbitrary firings will raise costs for employers by raising 
requirements for severance pay. The worry is that the new Labour Contract Law will adversely 
impact the country’s economy at a time when export-oriented enterprises, especially labour-
intensive firms, already encounter increasing difficulties in operation, due to factors such as the 
renminbi appreciation, the rise of wages and production costs and declining demand for Chinese 
products worldwide. Despite this ongoing contention and dispute, the new regulation has so far been 
absent from economic research radar screens.  
                                                 
1 Over the last few years, disputes over the widespread employer practice of failing to pay wages due and 
owing on time and in full, low wages, forced overtime for little or no additional pay, unsafe working 
conditions and the lack of benefits, have all developed into mass protests. Furthermore, land disputes are 
exploding both in urban and rural areas as local governments in pursuit of economic growth requisition land 
for developers, often raising issues of corruption and collusion. 
2 The way of translating the law, the Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa (in Mandarin) differs. 
This article uses the expression “Labour Contract Law”. 
3 Several observers have suggested that the provisions of the new law will potentially have wide-reaching 
ramifications for firms in China (http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9546386).   
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Against this background, this paper looks at the transmission from structural reforms in labour 
markets to employment outcomes.4 Its main contribution is the use of a real options framework to 
identify employment effects. While it is certainly not a pioneer in applying a real option model to 
labour demand, it is to our knowledge the first to formalize the new Chinese policy framework and 
to investigate its dynamics.
The central question posed in this paper is whether China´s new Labour Contract Law has affected 
labour demand and employment. Despite a large volume of research, much controversy remains 
over the impact of employment protection legislation on labour market performance. Employment 
protection serves a useful purpose in securing workers against job loss.5 However, serious concerns 
remain about the potential negative impact of stringent statutory employment protection. On 
balance, the evidence suggests that stringent employment protection legislation is associated with 
lower employment levels, but some commentators also have strong suspicions that it leads to higher 
structural unemployment. On the other hand, it is reasonably well established that employment 
protection reduces turnover in and out of unemployment. Moreover, employment protection 
legislation may strengthen the hand of insiders in wage bargaining, adversely affecting the wage 
setting schedule and employment outcome.6  
The paper is organised as follows. The purpose of Section 2 is to review the main ingredients of the 
new Chinese Labour Contract Law. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework providing a nexus 
between labour market regulation and employment. Section 4 illustrates the potential impacts of the 
new legal framework using model simulations for different scenarios. This allows to develop a 
“feel” for the model and to “draw a map” of the factor demand sensitivity to various structural 
characteristics of the environment in which Chinese firms operate. Section 5 provides some 
concluding remarks. Two appendices at the end of the paper collect some proofs and technical 
derivations which are rather involved. Readers who are not interested in the nuts and bolts of the 
derivations, can skip the appendices without losing the main argument of the paper. 
 
2. The New Chinese Labour Contract Law 
 
The Labour Contract Law was enacted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on 29 June 2007 and became effective on 1 January 2008.7 The purposes of the new 
Labour Contract Law are to perfect the labour contract system, clarify the rights and obligations of 
                                                 
4 For an overview discussion of the relationship between labour market institutions and economic performance 
in terms of unemployment and growth, see Nickell and Layard (1999). 
5 The model below deals with employment protection and labour demand. It is well-known that employment 
protection can be justified on the grounds that workers are risk averse and that they do not have the possibility 
to privately insure themselves unemployment [see Bertola (2004)]. 
6 See Addison and Teixera (2003) for a survey of the literature. 
7 An excellent survey of the reasons for the enactment and the content of the Labour Contract Law is available 
in Cooney et al. (2007). A translation is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Employment_Law. 
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the parties, protect employees´ lawful interests and establish or strengthen stable labour relations.8 
Written labour contracts are the mechanism for doing so.9
Other provisions will, however, place more burdens on employers in general, including pressure to 
engage in collective bargaining over many issues and to consult workers on work-related issues 
including compensation, work hours, leave, occupational safety and health, insurance and fringe 
benefits, training, discipline and performance norms. The requirement to listen to the unions´ 
opinions strengthens the say of labour in business decisions. Some companies responded by forming 
in-house workers´ groups, but the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) objected, 
claiming that this amounted to the creation of an alternative labour union, and is thus illegal. Instead 
the ACFTU has used the new law as the basis for a huge registration drive and unrelenting pressure 
is applied to firms to sign up with the government-affiliated monopoly union. The stated goal is to 
have unions in all of China´s private firms by 2010.10
The basic rules of employment relationships are also changed in several important respects. 
Probationary periods for new workers are shortened to a maximum of two months (one month for 
employment terms of less than a year) from the current six months, unless the term is at least three 
years or without a fixed term, in which case six months is permissible - and the minimum salary 
during the probationary period is 80 percent of the starting salary for regular workers in the same 
position. Non-compete provisions restricting an employee’s post-employment options remain legally 
compliant, but the maximum term is two years - one year shorter than the three years now generally 
allowed in China - and they are restricted to senior managers, senior technical personnel and other 
personnel with confidentiality obligations. 
Employers contemplating a reduction in force of 20 or more employees or 10 percent or more of the 
workforce are allowed to do so in the context of a bankruptcy restructuring, severe production 
difficulties or change of production, technology or business form, but must give the union or all 
workers at least 30 days’ advance notice. Mass firings because of labour problems are therefore 
impermissible. 
Among the biggest changes are new termination provisions. Business associations sought to reduce 
firing costs, whereas unions pushed for job security and compensation in the event of dismissals. 
The previous labour law had allowed workers to be hired in a series of fixed-term contracts, thereby 
                                                 
8 The legislation was finalised parallel to the public furore in June 2007 over slave labour conditions in the 
brick industry in the province of Shanxi. The investigations revealed that rural migrant workers, many of them 
teenagers, were being kidnapped, sold to brick factories operating without licenses and forced to work up to 18 
hours a day for no pay. 
9 Written contracts have already been required under the previous labour contract law (1994) , but this 
requirement was often disregarded, particularly in casual employment industries like construction, where 
migrant workers have often been mistreated and deprived of promised compensation. Party-run courts often 
fail to enforce their legal rights. 
10 For example, in a reflection of just how difficult business conditions are in China, Walmart has recently 
signed a collective-bargaining agreement with the ACFTU. By contrast, firms that resist will be blacklisted and 
face the risk of being subject to endless audits, tax examinations and accusations of employment contract law 
violations.  
 4
allowing either party to terminate an employment relationship without penalty or severance pay by 
simply letting the contract expire. One key provision of the new Labour Contract Law is that 
workers who have been employed at the same enterprise for 10 years or more will be legally entitled 
to an “open-ended” labour contract, which should guarantee them adequate financial compensation 
should they be made redundant (one month of base salary per year of employment up to a maximum 
of 12 months for 12 years).11 Where severance is payable, it is based on the employee’s income for 
the 12-month period immediately preceding the date of termination (and “income” includes base 
salary, bonus, subsidy, allowance, commission, etc., paid to the worker). 
Under the new Labour Contract Law, the maximum number of fixed-term contracts is two. 
Afterwards the fixed-term contract is subject to a conversion requirement. Employees who have at 
least 15 consecutive years of service and who are within five years of retirement age (60 for men, 55 
for women in general; five years younger in physical occupations) are protected from termination 
because of a deterioration in capability or a reduction in force by the employer. Temporary 
employees paid on an hourly basis will be treated as regular employees if they work more than 24 
hours a week. Finally, the new Labour Contract Law offers another pathway from temporary to 
permanent work.  Chinese companies often employ a large number of temporary workers hired 
through temporary work agencies. Temporary work encourages management to avoid the 
protections and commitment that come with standard employment. Under the new law, temporary 
work agency workers would become permanent employees after one year of employment at a client 
firm, thus reducing the number of insecure, contingent jobs. 
Having described the new Chinese labour regulations, we next model the behaviour of private 
firms.12 We are interested in the way in which firms adapt their behaviour to the constraints of 
labour regulations and whether the new Chinese Labour Contract Law is an obstacle to employment.  
 
3. Setting the Stage: Modelling Firms´ Behaviour 
 
Recent theoretical analyses of factor demand under uncertainty have highlighted the effects of 
irreversibility in generating “real options”. In these models the interaction of time-varying 
                                                 
11 Several employers have panicked on learning of the unlimited labour contract provision and have seeked 
loopholes in the new Labour Contract Law. The most noted example of this tactic was the move by Huawei - 
the former state-owned enterprise and now privately owned telecommunications conglomerate based in 
Shenzhen - to persuade about 7,000 employees who had been with the company for more than eight years to 
resign. In return, the employees received a lump sum of one month’s salary for every year of employment, 
plus one additional month’s salary, and were allowed to rejoin the company on a short-term contract. The 
generosity of the provision may be explained in part by the inadequacy of government-provided 
unemployment benefits in China. 
12 Chinese industry comprises a number of different forms of firms ranging from foreign companies to state 
owned enterprises. The degree to which these might approximate a competitive firm presumably varies with 
the type of organization. One should be aware that state-owned firms may show less concern for employment 
regulations than those completely private. Larger employment adjustments in state-owned firms often involve 
generous packages transferring, at least partially, the adjustment costs to taxpayers. 
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uncertainty and irreversibility leads to a range of inaction where factor demand is zero as the firm 
prefers to “wait and see” rather than undertaking a costly action with uncertain consequences. 
Indeed, waiting allows firms to gather new information on the uncertain future. Below we therefore 
develop a real options model with a rich specification of adjustment costs. Applying the real option 
theory to the case of labour demand derives from the fact that hiring and/or firing decisions are 
rarely now-or-never decisions. In most cases, it is feasible to delay action and wait for new 
information.13 Empirical counterparts to the variables outlined in this section are discussed in 
Section 4.14 It is assumed that a represented firm has the following Cobb-Douglas production 
function 
 
(1) αα −Λ= 1LKY , 10 << α , 
 
where Y denotes real output, α  is the distribution parameters, L is the number of employees 
subject to changes due to hiring, firing and/or natural attrition, and K is the constant level of the 
capital stock, and  is the labour productivity growing at a rate of Λ Λη .15 We further assume that the 
firm faces an isoelastic demand function 
 
(2) ( ) ,1 ZYp ψψ−=  1≥ψ  
 
where p represents the price, Z denotes the demand shock, and ψ is an elasticity parameter that takes 
its minimum value of 1 under perfect competition [see Abel and Eberly (1994)]. Therefore, current 
profits, measured in units of output, are defined as 
 
(3) ( ) (ICLwLKZ −+−Λ=Π
−
τψ
α
ψ
α
ψ 1
11
)
                                                
, 
 
 
13 Although an established literature exists on labour demand under uncertainty using real options models, this 
is not true for the transition economies. The approach tentatively adopted here is therefore to draw upon the 
former while considering certain modifications to allow for Chinese realities. 
14 In this paper we consider labour market regulations as given, treating them as exogenous. On the contrary, a 
new branch of research treats regulations as endogenous and attempts to understand better their formation. One 
view is that regulations are shaped by the political power of political groups [Acemoglu et al. (2005)]. Hence 
specific regulations are developed to facilitate the appropriation of existing rents by certain groups. The second 
view is that regulations are rent-creating institutions arising from redistributive conflicts [Saint-Paul (2000)].   
15 For the sake of simplicity we have used a Cobb-Douglas production function restricting the elasticity of 
substitution to unity. For a real options model with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production 
function, see Chen and Funke (2004). Note that the production function methodology assumes that firms 
operate on the production frontier, whereas in reality Chinese firms may be operating below the production 
frontier during transition. 
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where real wage, w, is assumed to grow deterministically at a constant rate wη , τ denotes non-wage 
labour costs, and I represents gross changes of employment due to hiring and hiring – positive I 
denotes hiring and negative I firing – and C denotes the total costs of hiring and firing, consisting of 
a fixed and variable component 
 
(4) ( )
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
<+−
=
>++
=
.0for      
2
1
,0for                                0
,0for       
2
1
2
2
ttftff
t
tththh
t
IIIpc
I
IIIpc
IC
γ
γ
 
 
When the firm hires (fires) workers, it pays a fixed cost  hc ( )fc   and positive unit costs of hiring 
(firing) which may be rising in the number of workers hired (fired), phI+1/2γhI2 (or −pfI+1/2γfI2), 
respectively. Note that −pfI > 0 for firing since I < 0 in this case. The coefficients fhc  denote the 
fixed costs whenever the firm decides to hire or fire; the fixed costs are usually related to 
advertising, the screening process, and so on; the fixed costs for firing are related to legal 
consultations, disputes about firing, and the trade union’s cooperativeness. The parameters ph and pf  
refer the unit costs of hiring and firing respectively. The parameters γh and γf regulate the extent of 
more or less speedier employment adjustment due to hiring and firing regulations. All parameters in 
equation (4) are positive.16 The net employment changes over time for the firm are denoted by 
hiring/firing minus quits 
 
(5) tt
t LI
ds
dL λ−= , 
 
where λ  denotes the constant quit rate per unit time. The representative risk-neutral firm maximises 
its discounted flow of profits 
 
(6) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
=Λ=Λ==
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −+−Λ= ∫∞ −
−
0
0000
11
,,,1max wwLLZZdteICLwLKZEV rtttttttI τψ
α
ψ
α
ψ , 
 
where E[·] denotes the expectation operator given the information set available to the firm at period t 
= 0, and r is the constant required rate of return. The intertemporal objective function implies that 
                                                 
16 Following the standard modelling approach, we assume that other factors can be instantaneously and 
costlessly adjusted. Optimal stopping models with interrelated factor demand decisions are analysed in Chen 
and Funke (2008), Eberly and van Mieghem (1997) and Dixit (1997). 
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firms form expectations and beliefs on the future behaviour of the driving economic variables, which 
cannot be predicted with certainty. The modelling framework has to account for this challenge and 
has to formalise this issue in a coherent framework. This notion is formalised by assuming that the 
stochastic demand factor Z follows a geometric Brownian motion  
 
(7) tttt dWZdtZdZ ση += , 
 
where  is a Wiener process, W dtdW tt ε=  (since tε  is a normally distributed random variable 
with mean zero and a standard deviation of unity with no serial correlation due to the assumption of 
independent increments of the Wiener process), η is the drift term and σ  is the variance parameter. 
Using Itô´s Lemma, the Bellman equation for the value V at time zero is 
 
(8)       ( ) ( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
++Λ++−+−+−Λ= ΛΛ
−
Λ
ZZZwwL
I
VZZVVwVLIVICLwLKZrV 22
11
2
11max σηηηλτψ
α
ψ
α
. 
 
The first three terms in the square bracket represent the firm’s immediate profits at t = 0 after 
deducting the total wage bill and costs related to hiring and firing; the fourth term shows changes in 
the value of the firm due to fluctuations in L due to quitting or hiring/firing; the fifth and sixth terms 
denote the impacts of changes in w and Λ  on V over time; and the final two terms show the effect of 
changes in Z on the value of V. 
The representive firm decides the optiomal condition of hiring or firing. The boundary conditions for 
hiring and firing for equation (8) can be summarised by the following two equations (see Appendix 
A): 
 
(9) hhh cpHv γ2+==       for hiring thresholds, 
 
and 
 
(10) ( )fff cpFv γ2+−=−=  for firing thresholds, 
 
where H denotes the effective hiring-cost threshold, depending on the fixed costs, unit costs and 
adjustment speed costs parameters of hiring; F is the effective firing-cost threshold; and  is the 
marginal inter-temporal value of profits with respect to workers. In the inaction area where 
the firm does nothing and the number of employees only falls due to quits. The 
LVv =
HvF <<−
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magnitudes of H and F are positive functions of fixed costs ( )fhc , unit costs of hiring and firing 
( )fhp  and the adjustment costs ( )fhγ . At the hiring (firing) thresholds, the firm would hire (fire) 
the following number of workers (see Appendix A for derivation), 
 
(11) hhcI γ2=  for hiring; 
 
(12) ffcI γ2−=  for firing. 
 
As fixed costs increase, the firm chooses to hire/fire more employees so that total benefits of 
hiring/firing outweighs the total cost. With lower values of fhγ the firm would also hire/fire more 
workers. The inaction area is smaller for lower fhc  and fhγ  since the firm needs to pay lower 
fixed and adjustment costs for the same numbers of hires/fires.17 The marginal intertemporal values 
of employees for the boundary conditions of hiring and firing, v, in equations (9) and (10) are 
subject to the following partial differential equation, as shown in Appendix A 
 
(13) ( ) ( ) ZZZwwL vZZvvwvLvwLKZvr 221
11
2
1 11 σηηηλτψ
αλ ψ
α
ψ
α
++Λ++−+−Λ−=+ ΛΛ
−−Λ , 
 
where , , , LVv = LZZ Vv = LZZZZ Vv = LLL Vv = ,  ΛΛ = LVv , and Lww Vv = . The solution for ( )Zv  
consists of the particular solutions and the homogenous solutions. The particular solutions, can be 
obtained from the direct integration of the following particular integral without considering hiring 
and firing 
 
(14) ( ) ( ) ( )
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
∫ ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+−Λ−= ∞ +−
−−Λ
0
111
11 dsewLKZEZv srssss
P λψ
α
ψ
α
τψ
α . 
                                                 
17 Note that with null fixed costs and adjustment costs, equations (9) and (10) are reduced to the same forms as 
in Bentolila and Bertola (1990). Their implicit assumption is that the intertemporal value of marginal 
employees, v, never deviates outside of the inaction area of  
fhpv ±= . 
Very small values of  fhγ  guarantees that the firm can hire/fire a lot of employees [according to equations (5) 
and (11)]  
⇒−= NIdtdL δ  ( ) tLfhfhcI Δ+±=Δ δγ2 . 
This makes v fall back into the inaction area of  
fhpv ±=  
immediately for any given shocks for very small values of fhγ . 
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 After integration, we obtain the particular solutions 
 
(15) ( ) ( ) ( )w
P
r
w
r
LKZ
Zv ηλ
τ
ψ
ηηψ
αλ
ψ
α ψαψα
−+
+−
−−−+
Λ−
=
Λ
−−Λ
1
1
1 1
11
. 
 
The homogenous solutions, often representing the options to hire and fire, can be obtained from the 
homogenous part of equation (15). Letting v  be the value of the option, the general solutions for 
the hiring and firing options (  and ) have the following forms, respectively (see Appendix B 
for details): 
G
G
Hv
G
Fv
 
(16) ( )
1
111
1
β
ψ
α
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
Λ=
−−Λ LZAZvGH  
 
and 
 
(17) ( )
2
111
2
β
ψ
α
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
Λ=
−−Λ LZAZvGF , 
 
where β1 and β2 are the positive and negative roots of the characteristic equation 
 
(18) ( ) 011
2
1 2 =−−−++− Λ rλβψ
α
ψ
ηηβββσ . 
 
To satisfy the boundary conditions for hiring and firing that ( ) 00 =GHv  and  = 0, we use the 
positive solution for  and the negative solution for .  
( )∞GFv
G
Hv
G
Fv
When there are effective costs of either hiring or firing as shown in (9) or (10), the firm will consider 
the option value of maintaining her current position against the alternative of hiring or firing. In 
other words, it should be evident that the hiring and firing policy of the optimising firm is 
discontinuous. In some periods the optimal strategy of the firm will be to adjust the number of 
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workers. Under other demand conditions a wait-and-see attitude will be chosen. More specifically, 
hiring and firing costs generate a corridor of inaction (status quo policy) within which firms do not 
change their workforce. This region is identified by the lower, ZH, and higher, ZF, control barriers. 
The definitions of the hiring and firing barriers, ZH and ZF, are given by the smooth-pasting and 
value-matching conditions below.  According to the value-matching conditions the firm would find 
it optimal to exercise its option to hire or fire the marginal worker once Z hits one of the two barriers 
 
(19) ( )
( ) 12 111
1
111
2
111
1
1
1 β
ψ
α
ψ
β
ψ
α
ψ
ψ
α
ψ
α
ψ
ηλ
τ
ψ
ηηψ
αλ
ψ
α
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
Λ+=⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
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⎜
⎝
⎛
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+−
−−−+
Λ− −−−−
Λ
−−
LZAHLZA
r
w
r
LKZ
HH
w
H
 
 
and 
 
(20) ( )
( ) 21 111
2
111
1
111
1
1
1 β
ψ
α
ψ
β
ψ
α
ψ
ψ
α
ψ
α
ψ
ηλ
τ
ψ
ηηψ
αλ
ψ
α
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⎥
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⎢
⎣
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Λ
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r
w
r
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w
F
. 
 
The left-hand side of (19) has the marginal benefit of hiring which includes the acquired firing 
option. The right-hand side has the marginal cost of hiring, which includes the sacrificed hiring 
option. Similarly for equation (20), the left-hand side has the marginal benefit and the right-hand 
side the marginal cost of firing. There are four unknown variables, YH, YF, A1, and A2, in equations 
(19) and (20).  
The smooth-pasting conditions ensure that hiring (firing) is not optimal either before nor after the 
hiring (firing) threshold is reached. In technical terms, this means 
 
(21) ( ) 1
111
11
1
111
22
111
1
1
2
2
1
1
−−
−
−−
−
Λ
−−
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
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⎜
⎝
⎛
Λ=⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
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⎜
⎝
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β
β
ψ
α
ψβ
β
ψ
α
ψ
ψ
α
ψ
α
ψ
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ψ
ηηψ
αλ
ψ
α
HH ZLAZLA
r
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and 
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(22) ( ) 1
111
22
1
111
11
111
2
2
1
1
1
1
−−
−
−−
−
Λ
−−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛Λ=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛Λ+
−−−+
Λ−
− β
β
ψ
α
ψβ
β
ψ
α
ψ
ψ
α
ψ
α
ψ
ββ
ψ
ηηψ
αλ
ψ
α
FF ZLAZLA
r
LK
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To determine the optimal labour demand policy of the firm one needs to identify the no-action-zone. 
This involves calculating the optimal upper and lower control barriers as functions of the parameters 
of the model. There are no closed-form solutions to the model.  However, the non-linear system of 
equations (19) - (22) with unknown parameters  can be solved numerically once 
the solutions for β
21  and , , Z, AAZ FH
1 and β2 are obtained from (18). This allows calibrations of the model and makes 
the model amenable to graphical analysis.  
 
4. The New Chinese Labour Law and Employment: Illustrative Model Simulations  
 
The preceding section has laid out the model economy. Having illustrated that the stochastic 
framework has important ramifications for the dynamic behaviour of employment, we proceed in 
this section to use the theoretical framework above to carry out a number of calibrations shedding 
light on the workings of the models and the economic forces at work. For this reason, the model is 
calibrated in order to match characteristics of the Chinese economy. The use of consensus estimates 
ensures that the calibration is based on the best up-to-date knowledge in the literature. In this way, 
applied economic modelling is likely to increase the credibility of the policy analysis. Whereas it is 
not possible to quantify the values of some parameters, economic common sense is used to make 
sure that the implication of such choices is not far away from reality.18  
We interpret time (t) as years and annual rates are used where applicable. Our base parameters are σ 
= 0.2, r = 0.12, δ = 0.05, η = 0.08, 029.0=Λη , 08.0=wη , α = 0.59, and ψ  = 1.2. The drift terms η 
= wη = 0.08 reflects the notable growth of the Chinese economy over time. The profit share (wage 
share) is assumed to be 0.59 (0.41).19 The growth rate of total factor productivity is assumed to be 
2.9 percent per year.20 This compares very favourably compared to other economies. Chinese 
exports mainly face competitive markets with rather elastic demand, and as a result most Chinese 
                                                 
18 Note that the goal of this paper is not to derive precise quantitative estimates of the impact of various labour 
market regulations, but rather to illustrate the qualitative predictions of our stylised model and to identify key 
features of the framework in determining the policy´s quantitative impact. Jensen (2002) refers to 
“compromise values” when choosing benchmark parameters that appear plausible for empirical studies. 
19 See He et al. (2006), p. 10. 
20 See He et al. (2006), pp. 10-11. 
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producers are price takers to some extent.21 Furthermore, structural reforms on Chinese product 
markets have covered a wide range of areas such as the privatisation policy, regulatory reform, and 
fostering competition from abroad. The immediate impact of such reforms facilitating entry of new 
competitors typically concerns allocative efficiency. We therefore assume ψ  = 1.2. The required 
rate of return is based on the firm´s cost of capital, plus a risk premium to reflect the project´s 
specific risk characteristics. The proper estimation of r therefore hinges on determining how market 
participants value risk-return opportunities given existing alternatives. In our baseline scenario we 
assume r = 0.12.22 The initial values of capital, employment, productivity, and wages are all 
normalised as 1, i.e. K = 1, , 10 == LL 10 =Λ=Λ , and 10 == ww . 
A number of different proxies for employment rigidity have been used in the literature, none of 
which has emerged as a clear favourite. Clearly, the design of labour market institutions is 
multifaceted and often of a highly qualitative nature, which is not easily captured in quantitative 
measures. Our employment protection parameters are drawn from the World Bank Doing Business 
Database which provides detailed cross-country information on the de jure labour legislation in 178 
countries around the world, using a standard methodology for all of them.23 The rigidity of 
employment index is a synthetic indicator of the stringency of employment protection, summarising 
different interrelated aspects of the legislation. Finally, the last three columns convey quantitative 
measures of the speediness of employment adjustment. 
 
Table 1: The Ease of Employing Workers – China Compared to Selected Economies 
Country Firing Costs 
(in Terms of  
Weekly Wages) 
Non-Wage Labour 
Cost (% of wages) 
Difficulty 
of Firing  
Index 
Difficulty of  
Hiring Index 
Rigidity of  
Employment 
Index 
China 91 44 40 11 24 
Thailand 54 6 0 33 18 
Vietnam 87 17 40 0 27 
India 56 17 70 0 30 
Philippines 91 7 30 5 35 
Hong Kong 62 5 0 0 0 
      
United States 0 8 0 0 0 
United Kingdom 22 11 10 11 7 
Germany 69 19 40 33 44 
                                                 
21 For example, in the year 2005 the top three markets where Chinese producers occupy the largest world 
market shares are textiles (35%), footwear (60%), and toys (40%). Most of these goods are characterised as 
low value-added and easy-to-substitute.  
22 Bentolila and Bertola (1990) have assumed r = 0.10 for advanced economies. 
23 There are limitations to the international and historical comparability of the measures. For example, in 
interpreting the numbers it must be borne in mind that summary indicators do not capture certain nuances 
which may nevertheless considerably affect the impact of employment flexibility. For instance it is difficult to 
take into account how procedures are actually applied, particularly where courts are involved. Furthermore, 
while the interests of workers are increasingly enshrined in law, their rights on the factory floor often remain 
precarious and are routinely ignored or violated by management. 
 13
Notes: All data have been derived from the Worldbank Doing Business Database (see 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/Documents/CountryProfiles/CHN.pdf). In the Doing Business Database, it is 
assumed that the company is a limited liability manufacturing corporation that operates country’s most 
populous city. It is 100% domestically-owned, and has 250 employees. The representative worker is assumed 
to have 20 years of tenure in the same firm. The cost of firing indicator measures the cost of advance notice 
requirements, severance payments and penalties due when firing a worker, expressed in terms of weekly 
wages. Flexibility of firing covers workers’ legal protections against dismissal, including the grounds for 
dismissal, procedures for dismissal (individual and collective), notice period, and severance payment. 
Flexibility of hiring covers the availability of part-time and fixed-term contracts. Finally, the rigidity of 
employment index is the average of the various sub-indices. The indices range from 0 to 100, with higher 
values indicating more rigid regulations.  
 
How does this law compare to similar laws that other emerging economies have on the books? Is 
this new labour contract law unprecedented or is China simply catching up with its peers? It is in 
relation to firing costs where mainland China looks rather bad by world standards: these amount to 
91 weeks of wages, compared with 62 weeks in Hong Kong. Overall, Table 1 indicates that China is 
a relatively difficult labour market in terms of firing costs and non-wage labour costs. In terms of 
hiring workers, China performs similar to its regional peers. Overall, the World Bank's Doing 
Business Database still ranks China above its regional peers India, the Philippines and Vietnam. 
Conversely, mainland China ranks far below Hong Kong. Furthermore, Figure 1 indicates that China 
still has a moderate overall employment regulation intensity on the global scale.24
 
Figure 1: The Overall Rigidity of Employment Index on the World Scale 
 
                                                 
24 China is ranked 86 overall for Employing Workers. Regardless of how it compares to labour laws in other 
countries, it is likely the first time a labour market of this size and significance has so swiftly shifted the 
balance of power away from the employers and into the hands of the workers and unions. 
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Notes: The index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulations. White shade: 0 < 
index ≤ 17; light-grey shade: 17 < index ≤ 28; medium-grey shade: 28 < index ≤ 38; dark-grey shade: 38 < 
index ≤ 48; black shade: index > 48. 
 
The numbers in the first column of Table 1 indicate that firing costs in mainland China are unusually 
high by international standards. However, the number is by no means as highly objective as it may 
appear at first glance. The reason is that it is based on very long tenure (20 years of service). Since 
we don´t want to resort to a less-than-realistic scenario, we assume a worker  with 5-7 years of 
continuous employment in the same firm. Based on a contextual inquiry and a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation, we assume firing costs of F = 1.0w for a worker.25 The hiring costs are assumed to be H 
= 0.1w.26 Finally, the non-wage labour costs are assumed to be τ = 0.44.27 These assumptions lead to 
the following benchmark for adjustment-related costs ensuring a realistic scenario: wch ×= 01.0 , 
 wc f ×= 1.0 , 1.0=hγ , 0.1=fγ , wph ×= 055.0 , wp f ×= 553.0  such that 
wH 1.01.001.02055.0 =××+=  and wF 0.10.11.02553.0 =××+= . 
We first vary the degree of uncertainty σ to to develop a “feel” for the model and to “draw a map” of 
the employment sensitivity to various structural characteristics of the environment in which firms 
operate. 
 
                                                 
25 Bentolila and Bertola´s (1990) estimates of firing costs in Germany are in the range 0.56 ≤ F ≤ 0.75 of the 
annual wage. The ratio F-Germany/F-China = 0.75/1.0 can also be reconciled with the ratio of firing costs 
across countries in Table 1 (F-Germany/F-China = 69/91 ≈ 0.75).  
26 The hiring costs are broadly consistent with the recruiting and training cost in Bentolila and Bertola´s (1990) 
and Mortenson and Pissarides´ (1999) calibration. They suggest that this number is consistent with survey 
results reported in Hamermesh (1993). While the choices of c, hγ ,  and fγ  might seem arbitrary, it is noted 
that in additon to achieve reasonable effective hiring and firing costs (H and F),  the corresponding I and 
related adjustment cost are plausible: 44.022 === fhfh ccI γγ . For the normalized L = 1, I = 0.44. 
implies that the firm could hire/fire 44 percent of workers in a year at the maximum. 
27 One issue for employment performance when analysing non-wage labour costs is the extent to which the 
total tax wedge on labour bears on the employer in terms of increased labour costs. This is because increases in 
non-wage labour costs can be shifted between employers (in the form of increased labour costs) and workers 
(in the form of reduced take home pay) by adjusting the wage level. 
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Figure 2: The Impact of Uncertainty Upon the Employment Thresholds 
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The results in Figure 2 indicate that the intertemporally optimising employer merely perceives there 
to be the possibility of a change in demand and profitability at some point in the future having an 
impact upon optimal employment. When firms perceive prevailing demand conditions to be 
transitory, in the sense that there are more frequent changes, then firms are more reluctant to hire or 
fire workers, i.e. a larger σ  will lead to a considerable widening in the no-action-zone. Conversely, 
smaller values of σ  results in a shrinking of the zone. In other words, in volatile environments, the 
best tactic is to keep options open and await new information rather than take an employment 
decision today. The intuition is that the firm can counteract the impact from additional uncertainty 
by a wait-and-see attitude for the time being. 
Figure 3 investigates numerically the impact of higher/lower hiring and firing costs in equation (9) 
and (10). The major result of the calibrations is that higher hiring and firing costs lead to an increase 
of the no action area, i.e. increasing hiring and/or firing costs increase the (upper) hiring threshold 
(ZH) and decrease the (lower) firing threshold (ZF).28 On the one hand, laws designed to protect 
workers against firing dampen unemployment because existing workers are fired less easily.29 On 
the other hand, firing costs make it more difficult for firms to fire workers, so firms hesitate to hire 
them in the first place, strengthening the hand of workers who already have a job. Fewer workers 
become unemployed, but those unlucky few are also less likely to find a job. The effects of tighter 
firing costs on employment are therefore theoretically ambiguous, i.e. higher adjustment costs do not 
necessarily imply lower average employment.  
                                                 
28 There could also be efficiency considerations to the extent that hiring and firing regulations and less speedier 
employment adjustment lead to long-lasting work relationships that encourage firms´ investment in the human 
capital of their workers, thus promoting productivity improvements. 
29 The lowish estimates of the economic impacts of the labour contract law miss out one thing. More stringent 
employment protection may reduce firms´ ability to cope with a rapidly changing global economy and take 
advantage of the opportunities offered by new technologies and access to new markets. Hopenhayn and 
Rogerson (1993) have presented a general equilibrium model with entry and exit of firms and show that a tax 
on job destruction can reduce employment significantly. 
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 Figure 3: The Employment Thresholds for Alternative Hiring and Firing Costs 
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One caveat of the previous analysis is that the graphs don´t specify the level of employment over 
time. Since the focus of the paper is employment, we next present a translation from thresholds to 
employment and assess the impact of various parameters upon labour demand. In order to get a clear 
“feel” for the dynamics of the model, we first have to specify a solution method that will lead us to 
generate discrete realizations of the level of employment, given the chosen levels of parameters. 
Several options are available at this point, but the structure of the model readily suggests using a 
sequential iterations method. It works as follows. Equation (7) is proxied by the following discrete 
stochastic differential equation - the Euler scheme, 
 
(23) tZtZZZ ttttt Δ+Δ+=+ εση1 ,       ( )1;0~ Ntε , 
 
where the normal random variables, tε , are generated via the central limit theorem and the Box-
Muller (1958) method for standardised normal distribution and tΔ  denotes small changes in time. 
Over time, the firm does nothing as long as the values for  generated by equation (23) fluctuate 
within the thresholds of hiring and firing – the inaction area. Note that as time passes, some workers 
quit and thus the inaction area shift downward due to the lower value of L even when the firm 
tZ
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doesn´t hire or fire. For every step in time tΔ , the firm hires tc hh Δγ2  or fires tc ff Δγ2  if 
 hits either  or . Thus, the gross changes in employment are govern by the following two 
discrete-time versions of equation (5): 
tZ HZ FZ
 
(24) ( ) tLcLL thhtt Δ−++=+ δγ21  for hiring 
 
and 
 
(25) ( ) tLcLL tfftt Δ−−+=+ δγ21  for firing. 
 
As the time passes, the term  fluctuates according to the corresponding stochastic processes and 
 declines according to the exogenous quite rate as long as  is staying within the no-action area. 
If  hits the thresholds (  or ), the firm will hire (or fire) employees to raise (or lower) L so 
that  is again within the no-action area soon, depending on the values of γ. 
tZ
tL tZ
tZ HZ FZ
tZ
All the above discussion has been concerned with the employment decision of a single firm. From a 
macroeconomic point of view, however, the question of primary interest is the impact of uncertainty 
and (partial) irreversibility on aggregate employment. Yet it is obvious that one cannot just translate 
mechanically the above microeconomic partial equilibrium results to aggregate employment. To 
assess the role of irreversibility in aggregate factor demand it is essential to take explicitly into 
consideration the heterogeneity of individual firms´ hiring and firing decisions. Suppose that we re-
interpret the model at the macroeconomic level, i.e. L now represents aggregate employment. Unlike 
microeconomic data, aggregate employment series look smoother since microeconomic adjustments 
are far from being perfectly synchronized. The question arises as to whether aggregation eliminates 
all traces of infrequent lumpy microeconomic adjustment. We again focus on employment (L), and 
we model aggregate employment in terms of average employment of a number of individual firms 
indexed by i ∈ [1,3000].30 Using this analytical tool, we solve the model with 3000 different seeds 
                                                 
30 We ignore behavioural assumptions regarding market rivalry, which in turn would necessitate some kind of 
game-theoretic analysis to take account of the strategic interactions among the firms, results of which are in 
turn heavily dependent on assumptions regarding the information sets available and the type of game being 
played. The ramifications of competitive interaction on the decision making of firms have been discussed by 
Smit and Ankum (1993) and Leahy (1993). Leahy (1993) has shown that the assumption of myopic firms who 
ignore the impact of other firms´ actions results in the same critical boundaries that trigger factor demand as a 
model in which firms correctly anticipate the strategies of other firms. Grenadier (2002) has recently extended 
Leahy´s (1993) “Principle of Optimality of Myopic Behavior” to the apparently more complex case of 
dynamic oligopoly under uncertainty. Both papers therefore permit to bypass strategic general equilibrium 
considerations when analysing factor demand under uncertainty. 
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for the random number generator. The resulting time series for aggregate employment are displayed 
in Figure 4 and 5 below.31
 
Figure 4: Aggregate Employment Dynamics for η = 0.08 and Z0 = 8.0 
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25% fall in F due to p f  reduction
Figure 5: Aggregate Employment Dynamics for η = 0.06 and Z0 = 8.0 
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η =0.06 
25% fall in F due to p f  reduction
Figure 4 and 5 simulate the aggregate employment dynamics for deterministic drift terms η = 0.08 
vs. η = 0.06 in (7) vs. (23) and alternative hiring and firing related costs. The deterministic drift term 
η = 0.08 in Figure 4 reflects the fast-growing Chinese economy and leads to an increase of 
employment of 20 – 30 percent over a 10 year horizon. The simulated employment dynamics 
provides a numerical measure how employment varies with growth in economic output, i.e. the 
series serves as a useful way to examine how growth in output and growth in employment evolve 
together over time.32
                                                 
31 Experimentation with larger numbers of runs shows no significant change to the results. 
32 In Figure 4 and 5, aggregation eliminates all traces of infrequent lumpy microeconomic adjustment. This 
smooth adjustment feature is consistent with the evidence in Caballero et al. (1995). The authors have 
proposed a framework allowing to link the probability distributions of the state of individual factor demand to 
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This implied employment elasticity is broadly consistent with the country-level estimates of the 
International Labour Organization for the period 2001 – 2005 and therefore the benchmark 
parameterisation of the model gets the employment-side of the macroeconomic picture right.33
The dashed line in the left panel of Figure 4 indicates that a 25 percent fall in overall firing costs F 
due to fall in . On the contrary, the right panel of Figure 4 summarises the inferences that can be 
drawn from reducing γ
fp
F vs. γH  and therefore the speediness of employment adjustment. The essence 
is that in a fast-growing economy less stringent firing costs have a negligible impact upon 
employment.34 On the contrary, a lower γH  parameter accelerates the job creation. Such a reduction 
of γH can be interpreted as a matching process that becomes more efficient generating less labour 
market frictions.35 Interestingly, the positive impact of such a reform turns out to be weak in the 
short run, suggesting that the full realisation of the employment gains are revealed not until some 
time had elapsed. 
All else being equal, Figure comprises the results for η = 0.06. As expected, the lower average 
growth rate of demand in conjunction with the same cost pressure leads to lower employment. 
Noteworthy, the qualitative results concerning F, γF and γH  are reobtained. Thus, the message of 
Figure 4 and 5 is that we can take some comfort that the new Labour Contract Law will not cause 
lower employment in mainland China.   
A proper discussion of the effects that changing labour market regulation brings to the rest of the 
economy demands that induced wage increases are discussed. A relevant feature of the modelling 
framework is that firing costs create a hold-up problem [see, e.g. Caballero and Hammour (1998)] 
enabling insiders (incumbent workers) to bid up wages once they are employed. In other words, 
firing costs make it difficult for firms to fire workers, so firms hesitate to hire them in the first place, 
strengthening the hand of workers who already have a job. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
cross-sectional distributions at aggregate levels. The paper suggests that idiosyncratic shocks tend to smooth 
out microeconomic rigidities by spreading agents in state space. 
33 The higher the elasticity, the more employment-intensive is economic growth. Chapter 19 of 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/ indicates that mainland China had an employment 
elasticity of about 20 percent over the period 2001 – 2005. η = 0.08 implies a growth rate of (1+0.08)10 ≈ 116 
percent over a 10 year horizon. A growth rate of employment of 25-30 percent over the same horizon therefore 
implies an employment elasticity of 20-25 percent, i.e. a 1 percent increase in GDP is associated with 
employment growth of 0.2 – 0.25 percent.  
34 This qualitative conclusion is similar to other studies conducted under this vein. See, for example, Bentolila 
and Bertola (1990). 
35 This confirms that more stringent hiring costs may be particularly problematic. There appears to be 
relatively straightforward empirical evidence that stringent employment protection legislation has a strong 
effect on market access of small- and medium-sized firms. It may be interesting to note, however, that the 
negative impact of heavy-handed regulation is found to stem not so much from barriers to entry as barriers to 
expansion, notably job protection laws that discourage new hirings [see OECD (2002)]. Since the difficulty of 
hiring in mainland China is still fairly low by international standards, the momentum for employment growth 
in China my not be reduced by the new Labour Contract Law. 
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Reports of labour shortages first cropped up in 2005, but observers initially thought the phenomenon 
was temporary. Now a surge in both turnover and wage costs is convincing multinationals and their 
suppliers that the China game has changed permanently with the gap between wages in China and 
those elsewhere gradually closing.36 Many firms are trying to escape rising wage costs by relocating 
on the mainland. But there are plenty of signs that labour costs are also rising in the Chinese 
hinterland. And no matter where they relocate on the mainland, manufacturers face the pressure 
from the appreciating renminbi and the elimination of tax rebates on many items used to make 
exported goods.  
Real manufacturing wages in China have more than doubled over the period 1995 – 2002.37 In the 
year 2007, increases in unit labour costs in manufacturing have also become more significant.38 As 
part of this power shift from employers to workers, we therefore adapt our simulations by assuming 
alternative wage growth trajectories. More precisely we assume that the new Labour Contract Law 
may encourage workers to demand higher wages. Rather than presenting static thresholds, we again 
focus upon the dynamic employment effects. In Figure 6, the implications of alternative wage drift 
terms ηw are illustrated graphically. 
 
Figure 6: The Employment Effect of Alternative Wage Drift Terms ηw  with Z0 = 8.0 
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The three alternative ηw drift terms typify different future wage pressures in the Chinese economy. 
Not surprisingly, higher wage growth rates (ηw = 0.085 and ηw = 0.09) compared to the benchmark 
(ηw = 0.08) lead to much lower employment. In other words, the two dashed lines indicate that the 
new Chinese Labour Contract Law might raise costs in an already tightened labour market leading to  
                                                 
36 Wages are rising for several reasons. Despite the increase in highly-skilled workers, a shortage of highly-
skilled labourers continues meaning that they can demand higher wages from companies lacking such skills. 
This has a knock-on effect on lower-level wages, as these workers feel encouraged to demand higher wages. 
37 See Figure 15c of http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/kilm/download/kilm15.pdf. 
38 See Figure 9 in http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CHINAEXTN/Resources/cqu_june08_en.pdf for 
empirical evidence.  
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wage growth remaining in “fast lane”. Taking the numerical simulations into consideration, we 
conclude that induced increasing unit labour costs represent the real issue and “achilles heel” for 
future employment growth in China. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
On January 1, 2008, the Chinese Labour Contract Law went into effect, ushering in sweeping 
changes to Chinese labour policy. A proper discussion of the effects that changing labour market 
regulation brings to the rest of the economy demands that policy changes are placed within the 
context of economic theory. This paper is an attempt at providing a theoretical framework that 
clarifies thinking on the inter-linkages between labour market regulation, option value and the 
choice and timing of employment. All in all, the paper demonstrates that the Labour Contract Law in 
a literal sense is no “wreaking havoc” and will not reduce employment in law-abiding firms. This 
result is robust to different assumptions made in calibrating the model. 
In contrast, higher future wage growth outpacing labour productivity growth will definitely slow 
employment down. The underlying motivation for the new Labour Contract Law may therefore be 
that China no longer wants to be the home of low-skilled, low-cost, low-margin manufacturing. 
Instead, Chinese companies should try to move up in the value chain. The government is backing the 
drive with a two-pronged approach: using incentives to encourage companies to innovate, but also 
moving to discourage low-end manufacturers from operating. By introducing tougher labour 
standards, the government has sent a powerful signal about its global ambitions, and helped 
encourage an exodus of factories from an area long considered the world´s shop floor. The Chinese 
government policies now favour high-tech economic zones, research and development centers and 
companies that promise higher salaries and more skills. It remains an open question whether this 
strategy creates sufficient employment opportunities for the large number of impoverished workers 
and translates into favourable outcomes, such as poverty alleviation. 
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Appendix A: Derivation of Equation (9) and (10) 
 
The Bellman equation for the value V at time zero is given in equation (8) in the main text. The 
first-order conditions for gross employment changes (I) of equation (8) in the text are denoted by 
 
(A1)   vIp fhfh =+± γ , 
 
where . Substituting the above equations into equation (8) yields LVv =
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for hiring and 
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for firing. Due to fixed costs of hiring and firing, the firm would only hire/fire workers whenever the 
total benefits of hiring/firing are greater than the corresponding total adjustments costs. Therefore, 
for hiring decisions , the benefits of hiring I employees, , must be greater than its total 
adjustment costs, 
( 0≥I ) Iv
2
2
1 IIpc hhh γ++ .  
 
(A4) 0
2
1 2 ≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ++− IIpcIv hhh γ .      
 
In case of firing ( , v is negative. Thus, the total benefits of firing )0≤I I  employees is captured by 
; while the total adjustment costs of firing are Iv 22MIpc fff γ+− . Thus the firm will fire 
workers as long as the following equation is satisfied: 
 
(A5) 0
2
1 2 ≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−− IIpcIv fff γ . 
 
Equations (A4) and (A5) can be simplified by using (A1): 
 
(A6) 0
2 >≥
h
hcI γ      for hiring 
 
and 
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(A7) 0
2 <−≤
f
fcI γ      for firing. 
                                       
The boundaries of the inaction area are then represented by following equations:  
 
(A8) hhh cpv γ2+=   for the hiring threshold 
 
and 
 
(A9) fff cpv γ2−−=   for the firing threshold. 
 
Substituting (A8) and (A9) back into (A2) and (A3) respectively gives (13) in the text. 
 
 
Appendix B: Derivation of Equations (16) and (17) 
 
The homogeneous part of equation (13) is denoted by 
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We assume that the homogeneous solutions have the functional form 
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where A is an unknown variable to be determined by the boundary conditions of hiring and firing. 
Note that K is assumed to be constant and hence does not affect the value of homogenous solutions. 
Therefore, we have  
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Substituting the above equations back into equation (B1) yields 
 
(B8) ( ) 011
2
1 1
11
2 =⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
Λ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−++−
−−Λ
β
ψ
α
ψλβψ
αβψ
ηηβββσ LZAr . 
 
Equation (B7) must hold for any value of A. Thus, we have 
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2
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Note that there are two characteristic roots for equation (B9). Therefore, the general solutions are 
denoted by 
 
(B10) 
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where 01 >β  and 02 <β . 
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